Trump’s interventionist isolationism: Venezuela as a symptom of a new world disorder
Janis A. Emmanouilidis | Almut Möller | Fabian Zuleeg
EPC Commentary
Brussels 01/2026
Donald Trump’s approach to Venezuela is not an aberration but a symptom of a deeper shift towards interventionist isolationism – the unilateral exercise of power without responsibility, which follows a revisionist agenda. By normalising neo-imperial behaviour, targeting even former allies and subordinating democracy, sustainability and the rules-based order to short-term leverage, this approach accelerates global disorder.
For Europeans, especially pro-European liberal democratic forces, the lesson is clear: Unless they adapt and fight back, they risk losing the ability to defend European values and interests, with lasting consequences for future generations.
As Fabian Zuleeg and Janis A. Emmanouilidis argue in Europe’s next watershed, Trump is best understood not as a traditional isolationist but as an interventionist isolationist pursuing a revisionist agenda. He rejects alliances, multilateral institutions and long-term responsibility, yet readily intervenes economically, legally and, where useful, militarily – including against (former) allies. This is not a retreat from global affairs. It is power exercised unilaterally, guided by an assessment of narrow and often personal interests.
Venezuela fits this pattern. There is no credible strategy for what comes next beyond asserting leverage and extracting control. Democratic transition, stabilisation and regional security appear secondary at best. This absence of an endgame is not accidental: interventionist isolationism applies pressure without ownership. Yet power exercised without responsibility rarely remains contained. If US personnel were attacked, escalation would be the more likely response, even if many Trump supporters are critical of foreign engagement.
Neo-imperial interests beyond Venezuela
This logic extends beyond Venezuela. Trump has already signalled neo-imperial interest elsewhere, notably in Greenland. This should not be dismissed as rhetorical theatre. Greenland is part of a broader agenda that seeks to weaken the European Union, further split Europeans and strengthen political forces ideologically aligned with Trumpism inside member states.
Consequently, Europe needs to be clear-eyed about the risk that Washington could pursue control of Greenland using economic pressure, transactional bargaining, personal relationships or security arguments. The common thread is neo-imperial entitlement based on power politics: territory, resources and strategic position are treated as negotiable assets rather than sovereign realities.
This points to a world increasingly organised around spheres of interest rather than shared rules – a development that will suit Vladimir Putin extremely well. If the US normalises the idea that great powers are entitled to dominate their neighbourhoods, Europe’s ability to resist similar claims elsewhere will be weakened. The damage could reshape expectations globally.
The same logic applies not only to places, but also to people. Acting directly against Nicolás Maduro signals a willingness to target individuals irrespective of office, precedent or international process. This coercion is increasingly personalised, and Europeans are not immune. Former EU Commissioner Thierry Breton and NGO representatives critical of the Trump administration have already been targeted and banned from the United States. Power is exercised through individuals as pressure points, while personal relationships increasingly displace institutions as the currency of international politics.
Implications for the world – and for Europe
The global implications are severe. Acting on thin pretexts without credible legal grounding undermines the United Nations Charter and weakens constraints on the use of force. It also fundamentally undermines the global system of governance set up over the past century: if sovereignty and legal process are optional for some, they become optional for all. Norm erosion spreads, accelerating the shift from rules to raw power – particularly in a system already contested as reflective of a post-WWII balance that no longer exists, and in the absence of a powerful coalition able to hold the ground.
This has direct consequences for Ukraine and for the future security architecture of the ‘old continent’. Europe’s defence of Ukraine rests on the principle that borders cannot be changed by force and that sovereignty must be respected. Here, Trumpian rhetoric about ‘peace’ is deeply ironic. Peace, in the Trumpian worldview, is defined as the absence of fighting imposed through dominance, not through stability or justice. By that logic, a coerced settlement in Ukraine could be hailed as success – even if it merely lays the ground for the next war. Venezuela illustrates how little ‘the day after’ matters in this approach – and why Europe should be wary of any peace framework divorced from deterrence and responsibility. Signalling support for Trump’s actions in Venezuela does not strengthen Ukraine’s position; it weakens the moral and legal case for resistance.
Venezuela should not be mistaken for a victory for democracy. The Maduro regime was undemocratic and illegitimate. But the Trump administration shows no intention of reinstating the legitimate winner of the last Venezuelan election and returning democratic control and sovereignty to the Venezuelan people any time soon. Democratic outcomes matter only insofar as they align with interests in the White House. Democracy is instrumentalised, not defended – a warning to those who assume US intervention automatically strengthens democratic governance.
The logic of interventionist isolationism also shapes US economic relations. Trade, sanctions, market access, regulatory reach and legal pressure are no longer governed by predictability or shared rules but by short-term advantage and coercive leverage. Interdependence is not managed; it is weaponised.
The oil dimension makes this brutally clear. Venezuela is treated as an exception precisely because of its vast oil reserves. Fossil fuels become a geopolitical prize rather than a transition challenge. Global sustainability will not be enhanced by this approach; it will be subordinated to control. Climate objectives, energy transition and long-term resilience are collateral damage when access to hydrocarbons becomes a strategic tool.
Europe must fight back
Interventionist isolationism is not a passing aberration. If pro-European liberal democrats fail to adapt and fight back, they risk losing their ability to defend prosperity, sustainability, security and liberal democracy for Europe’s next generation.
Europe therefore needs to act on several fronts:
1. Reaffirm European interests and democratic values in a lean declaration, which would also send a message to European citizens;
2. Close ranks among like-minded European countries, including in formats such as the E-3 and the Coalition of the Willing;
3. Ensure continued support for Ukraine and the build-up of European military capability;
4. Advance the construction of a new European security order;
5. Prepare and align concretely for scenarios involving Greenland and raise the costs of US unilateral action;
6. Speak clearly and publicly about Trump’s violations of international law;
7. Build a global coalition committed to international law and cooperation, including to upholding the UN Charter.
Europe still has agency. EU unity will be tested and dependencies will bite. But it is precisely because of these factors that Europe cannot accept fading into irrelevance without a fight. If we accept what is happening now without dissent, the next generation will find itself unable to oppose the hostile forces aligned against European democracy.
Janis A. Emmanouilidis, Deputy Chief Executive & Director of Studies, EPC
Almut Möller, Director for European and Global Affairs & Head of the Europe in the World programme, EPC
Fabian Zuleeg, Chief Executive & Chief Economist, EPC
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