EDITORIAL

By Antonio Missiroli

Implementing Lisbon: changes and challenges

It is not unusual for international treaties to be affected by... climate change. A recent example was the 1998 Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court: the general “spirit” in which the negotiations were first launched and later finalised evaporated just a couple of years after its signature, affecting both the treaty’s implementation and its overall impact.

It is even less unusual for European treaties to undergo a similar destiny. The Maastricht Treaty, for instance, entered into force almost two years after its original signature. In the meantime, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis had dramatically broken out, changing the entire context in which EMU had been planned and eventually agreed. On top of that, Yugoslavia had irremediably broken down, changing the whole framework in which the CFSP had been conceived and accepted.

The Lisbon Treaty is a quintessential case of such political climate change. Its most innovative bits were essentially agreed upon in 2003 (between the final stages of the Convention on the Future of Europe and the preliminary ones of the ensuing Intergovernmental Conference) and were first incorporated in the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty.

The repeated setbacks at national level that have marked the ratification process ever since have partially diluted but not fundamentally altered the substance of the initial arrangements. What has definitely changed since the 2001 Laeken Declaration that (re)launched the EU institutional reform process, however, is the political climate in which the new provisions have been (and are still being) put in place.

This is even more true of the broader EU political agenda. Little more than one year after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the overall picture has radically changed – both in Europe and worldwide – and further tectonic shifts may still be under way. First came the shocking experience of the December 2009 Copenhagen Conference on (real) climate change, where an ambitious EU found itself sidelined and incapable of getting its message across. Then the sovereign debt crisis prompted by Greece’s...
fiscal problems and aggravated by Ireland’s banking troubles hit the entire euro zone, highlighting the shortcomings and the unfinished business of Maastricht-style EMU – which were only marginally addressed by Lisbon. And now, of course, the events in the Southern Mediterranean.

Lost in translation?
Last but not least, the very nature and contents of the new treaty required additional negotiations both among the Member States and between EU institutions. That was certainly the case with the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the broader reorganisation of EU external action, but it became soon apparent also for other provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. Its actual implementation, in other words, is proving at least as important as its initial negotiation and ensuing ratification. Combined with the changed political climate – in Brussels as well as the 27 capitals – this may well translate into unexpected outcomes and produce unintended consequences.

Needless to say, the climate may change again. The severe pressure under which the Union is adapting its economic governance structures, for instance, may end up giving new impetus to the European integration process (and it is already prompting a new, if very limited, treaty change).

This is why the full implementation of the Lisbon Treaty is likely to take – and shape – the entire term of all the institutions currently involved in it. Perhaps only by 2013/14 will the dust settle and make both the formal set up and the actual modus operandi of the post-Lisbon EU fully legible.

And this is also why the analysis of such implementation is bound to remain a challenge and a work in progress – like Sigmund Freud’s analysis, a potentially interminable one.

This should not sound as an excuse for not undertaking it – on the contrary. The international high level conference on “Implementing the Lisbon Treaty”, organised on 9-10 February by BEPA and the Commission’s Legal Service in cooperation with DG Education and Culture, was explicitly meant to be a first opportunity to tackle the thorny issues related to the translation of the new treaty provisions into new realities and to highlight actual and potential developments.

President Barroso and a number of Commissioners and top EU officials took the floor to address them (their interventions can be found on BEPA’s website) and to animate a discussion that involved also academics, experts and think tankers from all over Europe.

This issue of BEPA Monthly Brief tries to offer a bird’s eye view of the debate by revisiting the main themes addressed during the conference. In doing so, it resorts to the benchmarks suggested on the occasion by all those speakers (starting with the Commission’s President himself), who proposed to explore whether the Lisbon Treaty increases the Union’s institutional efficiency, its political legitimacy, and the coherence and visibility of its external action.

The conference did not provide a conclusive answer – nor does, of course, this little Brief. The exploration, therefore, is to be continued, in the hope that the original “spirit” of Lisbon is not lost in transition.
1 A cure for the EU’s legitimacy deficit?

By Janis A. Emmanouilidis *

Does the European Union (EU) suffer from a legitimacy deficit? Frustration with the EU’s standards and performance in terms of representation and accountability accompanied debates on European integration since at least the early 1990s. For many citizens, the Union is a distant bureaucratic apparatus that lacks the appropriate structures for democratic input.

The steady fall in turnout at European elections, negative outcomes of EU referenda, limited recognition of the European Parliament’s (EP) democratic functions, or declining support for European integration are signs of public apathy and growing estrangement.

As a consequence, there is a widespread awareness that tackling the EU’s democratic shortcomings is a *conditio sine qua non* for the success of the European project. Already in 2001 the Laeken Declaration reflected this idea by stating that “the Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient”. Efforts undertaken to achieve this goal have led to numerous reforms elaborated in the framework of the Constitutional Convention and introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.

The new Treaty seeks to enhance democratic scrutiny at all levels by strengthening the EP, involving national parliaments, and empowering citizens. But will these reforms “cure” the legitimacy deficit as we know it?

**Strengthening the European Parliament**

The Lisbon Treaty has substantially strengthened the EP’s legislative, budgetary and nomination powers. In legislative terms, the Parliament has been put on an equal footing with the Council, with co-decision becoming the “ordinary legislative procedure”. In budgetary terms, Lisbon has given the EP full parity with the Council in approving all expenditures related to the annual budget. As for its nomination powers, the new Treaty has upgraded the MEPs rights in the (s)election of the Commission President.

In the first 15 months since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the Parliament has demonstrated its readiness to flex its new muscles. In a display of power, MEPs rejected the SWIFT agreement with the US, pressed the Council for a greater say concerning the European External Action Service, and effectively compelled Commission President Barroso to enhance the EP’s powers in the framework of a new inter-institutional agreement.

The assembly’s increased powers can – in theory – bridge the gap between the Union and its citizens. Given that the EP is the only EU institution with a direct popular mandate, it is reasonable to assume that more parliamentary authority would strengthen democratic accountability.

Such arguments sound appealing. However, they have so far failed the reality test. The logic of expanding the EP’s powers in order to “democratise” the Union inspired all previous rounds of treaty revision. Yet the strengthening of the Parliament has only been matched by falling rates of citizen participation. Voter turnout at European elections has alone dropped from 62% in 1979 to 43% in 2009. So why should the result be better this time around?

One effect might turn the tide: the Lisbon Treaty has the potential to increase the political ties between the Parliament and the Commission. The degree of interdependence is increasing, as more legislative proposals from the Commission require the EP’s approval and as the (s)election of the Commission President is more tightly linked to the outcome of European elections.

With the Lisbon Treaty in place one can already sense a rapprochement between the Barroso II Commission and a strengthened, more self-confident European Parliament. Linking the (s) election of the Commission President to the outcome of EP elections could further increase the “strategic partnership” between both institutions. This would not only boost citizens’ interest in European elections and in the role of

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the EP; it would also work to the advantage of the Brussels ‘executive’ by consolidating the political power base and popular legitimacy of the Commission, which has lost much of its strategic clout since the late 1990s.

Involving national parliaments
The Lisbon Treaty encourages national parliaments to get more involved in EU policy formulation, particularly by introducing the so-called “yellow” and “orange card”. The new provisions create an early warning mechanism, which allows national assemblies to scrutinise any proposal for EU legislation in order to assess whether it abides by the subsidiarity principle.

The stronger role bestowed on national parliaments could have a number of consequences at both national and European level. At national level, the “cards” offer parliaments – for the first time – an avenue to make their voice heard, distinct from that of their governments. The opportunity to exert ex-ante control weakens their argument about being sidelined in the EU’s law-making process.

Yet the new stipulations could overburden parliaments and have a negative impact on governments. In a number of Member States, the enhanced role of national parliaments could (further) limit the executive’s room for manoeuvre. Governments might be “obliged” to consult and coordinate more closely with their parliaments, which could indeed improve transparency but also restrict the executive’s autonomy.

Most national assemblies are already struggling with their workload and the eight weeks allowed for filing a subsidiarity complaint raise the bar even higher. Despite some successful try-outs between 2005-2009, one still needs to question whether parliaments will in “real life” be able to effectively scrutinise a body of EU legislation.

At European level, the stronger role for national parliaments could foster EU-wide debates and cooperation between national and European legislators. To make use of their new prerogatives, national parliaments and political parties will have to intensify cross-border cooperation. The latter could reinforce the ties between national and European parliamentarians.

Summing up, one must note that the overall impact of both “cards” will become clearer only over time – insofar as they are actually used in practice, thus creating precedents and prompting responses.

Empowering citizens
Last but not least, the Lisbon Treaty foresees more direct popular input by introducing the European citizens’ initiative (ECI), which aims to encourage citizens across Europe to mobilise in order to push the Union’s “legislative button”.

In early 2011 the two co-legislators – EP and Council – adopted the rules for the implementation of the ECI, which strive to make the citizens’ initiative as “user-friendly” as possible. The regulation allows more than one million citizens from at least seven Member States to invite the Commission to submit a legislative proposal within the “framework of its powers” and for the “purpose of implementing the Treaties”. Member States have now one year to transpose the ECI regulation into national legislation, which means that the launch of citizens’ initiatives will most likely be possible from the beginning of 2012.

The citizens’ initiative has attracted much interest from civil society organisations, NGOs and the media, and raised hopes that the new instrument could counter public disengagement with European affairs, stimulate transnational debates, promote the Europeanisation of national public discourse, and make citizens more aware of how the EU functions.

The aforementioned functions could benefit the Union’s democratic legitimacy. However, there are a number of risks associated with that. First, some initiatives might mirror particular interests pushed by a well-organised minority rather than a general will of European citizens. It seems unlikely that “ordinary citizens” will employ the instrument. The European public will instead have to rely on intermediaries, such as NGOs, trade unions, or lobby groups. Policy-making could, as a result, fall prey to a “tyranny of minorities” backed by resourceful interest groups able to organise transnational initiatives.
Second, the new instrument might become a source of misunderstanding and frustration on the side of organisers and signatories. This could be the case a) if the Commission’s response does not match the expectations of the organisers and supporters of an initiative; b) if a legislative act proposed by the Commission is substantially amended or rejected by the EU’s co-legislators (EP and Council); and c) because it will take years for a successful initiative to be implemented.

Bearing in mind both opportunities and risks, one should welcome the new instrument with a healthy dose of realism. The application of the citizens’ initiative will enrich the EU’s conventional participatory repertoire with a form of “advocacy democracy”, but it will neither alter the Union’s model of representative democracy nor substantially improve its quality.

Put simply, the new instrument will not in and by itself contribute to overcoming the EU’s democratic deficit. It will not fundamentally increase the degree of politicisation in the EU or give European politics the lifeblood of a vibrant democracy, which ultimately thrives on the clash of opposing arguments and the personalisation of political conflicts.

Too early to tell
Only 15 months after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it is still far too early to deliver a final verdict on whether the reforms will substantially contribute to making the Union more legitimate and more democratic in the eyes of citizens. But one thing seems clear: the strengthening of the EP, the enhanced involvement of national parliaments, and the introduction of more elements of direct democracy will not suffice to bridge the existing gap between the EU and its citizens. Boosting the Union’s “input legitimacy” is important. However, ordinary citizens (and elites!) will only appreciate and identify with the European project if the EU provides convincing evidence in everyday life.

Ultimately, the Union will be judged on the output it generates, and Member States bear the main responsibility for making the “new EU” capable of providing the kind of returns which may convince citizens of its future added value. Only if national capitals are ready, willing and able to deliver will the innovations laid down in the Lisbon Treaty stand a real chance of effectively countering the EU’s legitimacy deficit.
2 External action: a more coherent and comprehensive approach

By Franziska Brantner *

The brand new European External Action Service (EEAS) has been up and running for two months now. While it is still sorting out a number of organisational and staffing issues, one can already set one of the key benchmarks by which the EEAS will have to be judged on its first anniversary: did it succeed in making EU external action more coherent?

Key to the new body’s success will be coordination across policy fields and among the numerous actors at European and national levels. But it also means that High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) Catherine Ashton must pursue a comprehensive approach to foreign policy and build up integrated structures within her new diplomatic corps. While this holds true in general, it will be particularly crucial in the field of crisis management and peacebuilding.

And a first test for the EEAS ability to adopt a comprehensive approach will be Europe’s response to the tectonic shifts currently shaking the Southern Mediterranean.

Multi-dimensional coherence

The Lisbon Treaty designed the EEAS as Europe’s operational hub for external relations and the High Representative as its chief coordinator and consensus-builder. To live up to this job description, Catherine Ashton must ensure coherence across several dimensions: functional (the various policy fields), institutional (especially between the EEAS and the European Commission), and political (between EU and national levels). For its part, the EEAS must create the structures and mechanisms to coordinate foreign and security policy with a large variety of other areas that have an external dimension: development, civil protection, trade, agriculture, energy, migration, internal security, and economic governance - to name just a few.

But even within the specific realm of foreign policy, Catherine Ashton and the EEAS should take a more comprehensive approach. Specifically, the actions of all geographical and horizontal EEAS units, as well as the relevant Commission departments, should factor in human rights while dedicated structures (at EEAS headquarters as well as delegations abroad) must ensure that such mainstreaming actually takes place. The same goes for women’s rights and gender-related issues, which are pertinent to all aspects of foreign policy but have been neglected far too long.

Such cross-policy coherence requires of course close cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission. As Vice-President of the college, Catherine Ashton is charged with coordinating all aspects of the Union’s external relations. For this, she must work closely with her fellow commissioners. At staff level, the EEAS must be included in the Commission’s inter-service consultations just as any other Commission DG.

But institutional fixes alone will not do. Important hurdles to comprehensive thinking have been cultural barriers in the minds of European and national officials. EU foreign policy has long been hampered by turf wars and incomprehension between Commission, Council and national operators. Such problems must be overcome within the EEAS: in other words, the new service must swiftly create a common esprit de corps among its personnel. This will require, besides skillful leadership and appropriate incentives, common training for all EEAS officials. Such training, however, should also be open to Commission staff where appropriate. For a new gap has opened up over the past months: between the EEAS and the Commission.

Leading Commission and EEAS representatives have sometimes competed for the limelight. Collaboration has been, at times at least, insufficient. What is more, the Commission has refused to transfer a number of civilian crisis response experts to the EEAS and moved them instead to an accounting office (the Foreign Policy Instruments Service), whose main task is the financial implementation of decisions taken

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elsewhere. This approach should be reversed and the crisis response experts transferred to the EEAS – a move explicitly demanded by the European Parliament and the Council but ignored, so far, by the Commission.

**Singing from the same hymn sheet**

Getting things right in Brussels, however, will not be enough. Member States are used to defending their prerogatives in foreign affairs and will continue to carry out their own national policies. Catherine Ashton and the EEAS will have to ensure that this happens in a coordinated manner and that, on important issues, everybody sings from the same hymn sheet. Speaking with a single voice may not be a realistic expectation, at least at this stage, but conveying a clear, common and consistent message to the outside world (and also to our own citizens) seems a reasonable benchmark.

One important instrument to this end will be the chairmanship of the Council’s foreign relations working groups, which bring together experts from the Member States and the Commission to prepare and coordinate most policy decisions. These groups are now chaired by EEAS officials selected by Catherine Ashton and no longer by the rotating Council presidency. The EEAS must make full use of this new role to deliver more “horizontal” coherence in external action.

Council working groups in other domains, however, remain under the chairmanship of the rotating presidency, and they are becoming increasingly important also for external action. Catherine Ashton must find ways to tackle this problem, for instance by making sure that EEAS officials are represented in these groups whenever necessary.

**Crisis management and peace-building**

From an institutional point of view, the current crisis management and peace-building architecture is the weakest link in the EEAS. To tackle today’s security and humanitarian challenges, the EU needs integrated crisis prevention and response structures. The setting up of the EEAS offered a unique opportunity to overcome the institutional divisions that have often hampered effective EU crisis response and peace-building operations.

What is needed is an integrated crisis management and peacebuilding department within the EEAS. This would bring together all relevant services and resources previously scattered across the Commission and the Council. It would be able to tackle the whole conflict cycle, from prevention and mediation to management and response proper, up to reconstruction and reconciliation. All necessary instruments and tools (diplomatic and operational, civil and military, CFSP- and Community-based) would be at the disposal of such an integrated department, while the distinct decision-making procedures in CFSP and Community matters would be fully respected.

Such a department should be backed up by an EEAS crisis management board, bringing together its top brass, the Managing Director (MD) for crisis management and peacebuilding, the one responsible for global and multilateral issues (whenever appropriate), and the MDs and Special Representatives (EUSRs) for the regions affected by the crisis at hand. Unfortunately, this has not happened so far, and the EEAS has simply transferred under the same institutional umbrella the existing Commission and Council structures, without any significant change and clear organisational links between them. Additionally, as already mentioned, key crisis response experts are being kept out of the new service.

A group of MEPs has repeatedly raised this issue with the EEAS leadership, who has replied that current structures are still provisional and are under review, with a possible redesign by May 2011 already under consideration.

This second chance to set up adequate structures to prevent and respond to the conflicts of the 21st century should not be missed. And what is happening right now in the Southern Mediterranean will probably represent the first important test case for a better integrated EU policy and a comprehensive approach by the post-Lisbon Treaty structures.
If we apply to individual fundamental rights and their judicial protection the three parameters which have been the *leitmotiv* of the Conference, we see that the impact of the Lisbon Treaty in this field can be significant in terms of efficiency and political legitimacy. As for the Union’s visibility outside its borders, an important role can be played by the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

This is all the more true if one looks at the EU accession to the European Charter of Human Rights, which offers a unique opportunity to achieve a coherent system of fundamental rights’ protection in 47 countries across Europe.

Efficiency and legitimacy gains

In the field of justice, efficiency and political legitimacy are strictly interconnected: the more efficient the European judicial system is at protecting the rights of individuals *vis-à-vis* EU acts, the more entitled the EU is to be considered as a system based on the rule of law in which the power of institutions is accountable and submitted to effective judicial control.

The Lisbon Treaty improves the efficiency of judicial review in many aspects. It extends the full jurisdiction of the ECJ to the entire Freedom Security and Justice area. It gives the ECJ jurisdiction over CFSP when sanctions to individuals are at stake, and over its borders with other EU competences. It strengthens the judicial position of individuals claiming annulment of EU regulatory acts which are of direct concern to them and do not entail implementing measures. It allows accelerated procedures in preliminary rulings regarding persons in custody. And it speeds up infringement procedures in the event of non-enforcement of ECJ rulings by Member States.

The Lisbon Treaty also provides a new and stronger legal basis for the judicial protection of individuals in criminal matters. A further re-organization of the Court has been envisaged in order to speed up proceedings, *inter alia* by extending recourse to accelerated procedures for certain cases. The ECJ has recently displayed also a tendency to leave the final decisions to national courts - in a sort of judicial subsidiarity.

The Lisbon Treaty will increase the political legitimacy of the EU judicial system, too, since for the first time a panel of seven “wise men” (one of whom appointed by the European Parliament) will be heard on the nomination of new judges. Specialized courts will be established hereafter through ordinary legislative procedure, i.e. in co-decision with the EP.

Such a decision has important political implications. It has been noted, in fact, that the creation of additional EU courts (for instance on taxation or state aid) does not necessarily entail a reduction of the length of proceedings, since appeals may slow down the process. Therefore, the establishment of new specialized courts within the EU judicial system should be proposed with great care, as should be the attribution of jurisdiction on preliminary rulings to any judge other than the Court of Justice.

Chart(ered) territory

Justice is also an essential component of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which – by dint of Article 6 TEU – acquires the same legal value as the Treaties. The Charter consequently dictates judicial rules and guarantees (such as fair trial, right of defence, *ne bis in idem*) to the Court of Justice – in its various articulations – as well as to the judges in the Member States when they apply EU legislation.

More generally, the Charter of Fundamental Rights represents a major step in the process towards a ‘constitutional’ Europe. For the first time a clear and complete set of rights protected by the EU has been provided to its citizens. The Charter is the most modern and richest catalogue of rights in the world: some of those listed...
therein are not even included in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The visibility and importance of the Charter is witnessed by its influence on courts inside and outside the EU. In fact, not only does the ECJ constantly refer to it (as happened with around thirty rulings so far), also in connection with the ECHR; but also the Strasbourg-based Court uses the Charter as a means for interpreting the ECHR in order to review its own jurisprudence. This is striking but reasonable, as the EU Member States amount to a large majority of Council of Europe membership, which encompasses 47 countries.

The outcome of this parallel process is a mutual enrichment of both Courts, which are in quest of a constructive dialogue, as showed by the recent joint declaration by the two Presidents on EU accession to the ECHR. Many courts within the Union are also using the Charter to interpret domestic laws, sometimes even beyond its scope. One can therefore say that the Charter is paving the way for a common understanding of fundamental rights at all levels in Europe.

The EU accession to the ECHR – prescribed by the Lisbon Treaty and currently under negotiation – will undoubtedly be a challenge for the EU judicial system, raising problems of coordination between the Luxembourg and the Strasbourg Courts when an EU act is challenged as violating the ECHR. This coordination exercise may also offer an opportunity to foster dialogue and closer cooperation between them.

The Charter also influences the work of the EU institutions. A specific file on compatibility with the Charter is attached by the Commission to every new draft of EU legislation. Its Legal Service must also monitor the modifications to proposals made by the EP and/or the Council: in this case, however, the task may occasionally prove more arduous, as it is not easy to suggest further modifications when a political compromise has already been reached.

An ex post control on the compatibility of EU acts is also possible by means of judicial actions of annulment or infringement before the ECJ, even if – in this last case – the Commission would probably be confronted with strong political pressures.

What remains to be seen

Nevertheless, some grey areas persist. On the one hand, the Charter raises expectations that go beyond its original scope: it is sometimes difficult to explain to ordinary citizens that the Charter can be applied to the legislation of the Member States only insofar as they implement EU law. On the other hand, it is not very clear whether previous ECJ jurisprudence applies, allowing (or not) the Charter to be enforced also when Member States invoke derogations or mandatory requirements in order not to apply EU law.

Furthermore, the delimitation stated by the Charter between rights (which can offer grounds for judicial claims) and principles (that cannot be invoked directly in courts) is not always evident.

Finally, the Charter increases the external visibility of the Union through its values. It does so not only by imitation – as it can be a model also for other integrated regions in the world – but also by direct influence, as EU institutions are required by the Lisbon Treaty to pursue the coherence of external action also by promoting our fundamental values.
Arrivées

Philippe Legrain a rejoint le BEPA le 1er février en tant que chef de l'équipe “Analysis” et conseiller principal sur les questions économiques. Auparavant il était journaliste indépendant et écrivain se spécialisant sur les sujets de gouvernance économique et le contrôle des flux migratoires.


Enfin, Pierre Goudin, expert national détaché du Ministère français de l'économie, des finances et de l'industrie a rejoint l'équipe “Outreach” du BEPA au début février en tant que conseiller et suivra le dossier sur le marché intérieur.

Le BEPA souhaite la bienvenue à ses nouveaux membres.

Evénements

Le 1er février, une table ronde entre le Président Barroso, les conseillers spéciaux des Commissaires (qui se réunissaient en tant que groupe pour la première fois) et des fonctionnaires européens de haut niveau a eu lieu à Bruxelles. L’objectif de la réunion était de discuter de questions clés d’actualité face à l’Union européenne, en mettant l’accent sur le cadre financier pluriannuel et la crise économique actuelle.

Dans le cadre de son programme “Outreach”, le BEPA a préparé la visite du Président Barroso à Londres à la mi-février pour des rencontres clés avec des décideurs et des formateurs d’opinions britanniques. M. Barroso a eu une réunion bilatérale avec le Premier ministre Cameron, s’est entretenu avec l’archevêque de Cantorbéry à Lambeth Palace et les principaux laboratoires d’idées à Londres, et a donné le discours Alcuin à l’Université de Cambridge.


Le Groupe européen d’éthique (GEE) du BEPA a tenu sa 1ère réunion les 8-9 février à Bruxelles, en présence du Président Barroso et de Margaritis Schinas, le chef adjoint du BEPA.

Le 11 février, le BEPA a organisé une réunion de réflexion sur la question de l'équité intergénérationnelle. Les débats ont abordé quatre sujets: l'éducation, la santé et la protection sociale ; la durabilité et l'efficacité des ressources ; une gouvernance efficace ; et une croissance intelligente, inclusive et durable.

Le BEPA a organisé également le même jour un débat sur le thème “Transatlantic 2020” rassemblant des conseillers du BEPA, des
membres du Service d’action extérieure et des experts de laboratoires d’idées américains et européens. L’objectif de la réunion était d’examiner les tendances fondamentales sociétales, économiques, politiques et de sécurité qui toucheront l’Europe et les États-Unis au cours de la prochaine décennie, tout en essayant de discerner ce que ces tendances pourraient signifier pour le partenariat transatlantique d’ici 2020 et recommander des options politiques pouvant orienter ces tendances.


Activités à venir
Le BEPA organise le 9 mars un dîner de rencontre et de discussion entre le Président Barroso et le lauréat du prix Nobel en sciences économiques en 2010, le Professeur Christopher Pissarides. La Commissaire Vassiliou chargée de l’éducation, de la culture, du multilinguisme et de la jeunesse ; le Commissaire Rehn chargé des affaires économiques et monétaires ; le Commissaire Andor chargé des affaires sociales et de l’inclusion ; le directeur général du BEPA, Jean-Claude Thébault et le conseiller de haut niveau du Président de la Commission sur les questions économiques Antonio Cabral participeront au dîner et à l’échange de vues sur le renforcement du marché du travail et des possibilités de sortie de la crise financière.

Le lendemain, 10 mars, le BEPA organise le 20ème Séminaire Jacquemin, qui portera sur “Employment policies in times of crisis; the options” et qui sera présenté par le lauréat du prix Nobel en économie Pissarides. Les séminaires Jaquemin sont destinés à fournir un forum réunissant des membres du personnel de la Commission qui sont intéressés par les tendances et développements économiques actuels, et abordent les problèmes majeurs de micro-économie liés aux travaux de la Commission.
