Reassessing EU foreign policy
Challenges and tasks in the post September 11 era

Center for Applied Policy Research
May 2002
This paper comprises the results of a working group at the Center for Applied Policy Research, dealing with the consequences of September 11 for European foreign and security policy.

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For the following selected contributions see
http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/aktuell/positionen/index.htm

- Franco Algieri, EU foreign and security policy post September 11 – Some lessons for the reform debate and for transatlantic relations.
- Janis A. Emmanouilidis, EU Enlargement After September 11.
- Claus Giering, European Integration beyond September 11 - Impetus or blockade for the EU reform process?
- Josef Janning, After September 11 and Afghanistan - Transatlantic Relations in Transition.
- Iris Kempe, Keeping the Hotline Warm - September 11 and EU-Russia Relations.
- Wim van Meurs, September 11 and European Balkan Policies.
- Jürgen Turek, The Impact of Globalization on European Integration.

as well as

http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2002_Strategiepapier_KronbergVII.pdf


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INTRODUCTION

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States had a tremendous influence on international politics. Looking at the debate about the respective medium and long-term effects raises a multitude of questions. From a European perspective the question is to which extent the European Union’s foreign and security policy is affected. On the one hand one can argue that an impulse has been created to strengthen the EU’s role as an international actor. On the other hand the opinion prevails that the Union plays a rather marginal role. Immediately after September 11, European solidarity was repeatedly expressed and almost no doubts remained that the EU as well as the member states would staunchly cooperate with the US government in the fight against terrorism. The EU’s reaction to the terrorist threat became manifested in different ways and resulted in specific measures. In addition to the broad agreement to support the coalition against terrorism and the corresponding statements, a Plan of Action was adopted by a special European Council on 21 September 2001, comprising diplomatic efforts, police and judicial cooperation, humanitarian aid, air transport security, economic and financial measures and emergency preparedness.

However, the EU is not considered as a foreign policy heavy weight, and the United States demonstrated quite clearly that it is they that control and execute the fight against terrorism. Moreover, for the time being there seems to be no real need for the US to demand substantial European military support and the EU has no influence on the development of American foreign policy and Washington’s choice of a unilateral approach. In early 2002, when US President George Bush expressed America’s determination to extend the fight against terrorism on other countries (“axis of evil”), European criticism of American foreign policy became louder, but with only marginal effects.

As the world’s largest exporter and second largest importer, the EU can be defined as a leading international economic power. For a long period of time, and especially in comparison to the United States, it was mainly the trade dimension that was considered in describing the Union’s international relevance. Other external activities, like for example the cooperation and development policy, received less attention. With the development of a Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), the EU slowly began to sharpen its profile as a foreign policy actor. Adding the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to the CFSP has made European foreign policy a comprehensive process. But again and again, for many reasons, European foreign policy remained a target for criticism. Against such a background, this working paper analyses the specificity of EU foreign policy post September 11, asking whether the EU is a negligible actor or one that matters. Two questions are of particular concern:

- Are there any significant effects after September 11 on the EU’s external relations towards third countries and regions?
- What are the consequences for the post-Nice debate and the further development of the foreign and security policy of an enlarging EU?

The first part of the paper deals with the external dimension, by looking at the European policy towards selected third states and regions. The Middle East and North Africa are regions with which long-lasting forms of European cooperation and engagement can be found which are distinctively different in comparison to US foreign policy. The Balkans have become an area of tremendous EU involvement and a test case for European crisis prevention and crisis management capabilities. Relations with Russia are already a major aspect on the EU’s foreign policy agenda, and will become even more important with respect to the enlargement of the EU. Shaping policies towards these regions cannot be done by neglecting the transatlantic dimension. Thus, the EU’s external relations are to a large extent influenced by the quality and needs of the transatlantic link.

Analysing EU foreign policy furthermore implies respecting the internal dynamics of the EU and the mechanisms that influence the decision-making process. Consequently, the second part of this paper explains the importance of reforming the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in a comprehensive way. But the consequences of September 11 cannot be reduced to the foreign and security political implications. Not least since the EU is on the verge of enlargement it is necessary to consider new actors and interests. And finally, there is even a lasting effect on the further development of the European integration process.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

External dimension

The Middle East and North Africa

The September 11 attacks have demonstrated the necessity of the long-term approach towards the Middle East and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process there will be either a long-term management of the conflict by settlement, or break up altogether, with serious implications for regional security. After several months of benign neglect September 11 did convince the Bush administration that it ought to play a more active role in the conflict although it reduced at the same time its tolerance for what was perceived as Palestinian terrorism. However, the new envoy Anthony Zinni proved unable to bring the bloody war of attrition between Israelis and Palestinians to an end. Even worse, the cycle of violence and counter-violence ultimately culminated in a large campaign of the Israeli army that led, at least temporarily, to the re-occupation of most autonomous Palestinian areas in the West Bank.

Instead of embarking on a risky strategy of military intervention in Iraq, the EU should move towards a swift implementation of and further evolution towards a regime where restrictions on – and delays to – Iraqi non-lethal imports are lifted. At the same time military controls must be kept in place, and some form of weapons of mass destruction monitoring needs to be re-established. Such a policy would also have a good chance of restoring some cohesion in the alliance, and of avoiding problems with, and within, friendly states in the region. The EU and the United States should agree on a common agenda for a “post-Saddam” era in Iraq, regardless of when it comes about. It would be a good idea to outline the conditions under which an Iraqi government could be reintegrated into the international community and receive the support required for the reconstruction of its infrastructure.

Concerning the Southern Mediterranean countries the EU should embark on a pragmatic dialogue on terrorism with its partner countries while adopting a higher profile on issues of democracy and human rights. To the countries having signed association agreements the EU should offer to enter into a comprehensive policy dialogue aimed at creating a “Mediterranean
tiger” – as a role model of successful development. These “association partnerships” will eventually lead to a type of relationship somewhere between a mere association and a full-fledged EU membership.

The Balkans
At first glimpse one could be tempted to ask whether the recent successes of the European Balkan strategy combining crisis management and military presence with reconstruction and reform assistance might serve as a model for a post-Taliban Afghanistan. A “Balkan model” or a “stability pact for Afghanistan,” however, might be a fallacy. The promise of a (long-term) perspective of EU accession gives the states and nations of the Balkans a common objective they never had before. It also gives Brussels the leverage needed to push and guide unpopular reform processes and to stimulate economic development and political democratisation in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

Despite the virulence of the ethnic and territorial conflicts in the Balkans, state sovereignty is and remains the highest goal. Conversely, for at least the past twenty years Afghanistan has not seen any ruler seriously concerned with any sovereignty based on more than military force and control over strategic locations. The key premises of European stabilisation policies for the Balkans are missing in the case of Afghanistan. Whereas the Balkan model may not be transferable, the key lesson learnt in that region over the past ten years, however, may remain valid. Without an equally substantial and determined program of humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction and political stabilisation, no military intervention – no matter how massive – can produce long-term stability and security. The political will and stamina of the international community to stimulate and guide processes of stabilisation and sustainable development for years and decades on end will be decisive.

During the war in Afghanistan, the USA and its European allies agreed on a combination of military power and humanitarian aid. In the implementation of the Bonn Agreement, the diverging American and European philosophies of stabilisation and modernisation as well as the balancing of hard and soft power projection are bound to reappear. In the aftermath of the bombing, the US aversion against peace-keeping missions and comprehensive post-conflict
strategies already reappeared. These policy preferences are reminiscent of Balkan exit strategies and a division of labour between US warfare and European post-war reconstruction.

**Russia**

The crucial question remains to what extent the consequences of September 11 will go further toward impulses to strengthen integration and co-operation between East and West than single-issue short-term action. The current situation can be best described as a window of opportunity: If Russia continues its policy of becoming a modern European country, the EU will be facing the challenge of its growing importance. Future developments depend on Russia's strategic choice of further modernisation and the EU's capacity and capability to be a security and defence actor in the international arena.

The European Union and its member states fulfil several conditions for a modernisation partnership. The EU is customer number one for Russian exports, and with about 40 percent amount of foreign direct investment, the EU member states are the biggest direct investors in Russia. The Union is also the largest provider of technical assistance to Russia. Furthermore, supporting the Central and East European candidates states through the combination of impending membership and rule-setting for internal development from the outside is a unique success story for stabilising transition processes. If Russia is setting new goals for its transition, the Union should use these experiences to stabilise internal Russian developments. Potentially, the EU policies of the technical assistance program TACIS and the humanitarian aid office ECHO can be adopted to the additional requirements. A clear concept of designing a common European economic area is still missing, but nevertheless extending security related co-operation towards a widespread partnership might be a fresh impulse. Taking into consideration requirements of Russian modernisation, the economic relationship should go beyond energy exports from Russia to Europe.

**United States - The transatlantic dimension**

The deep impact the events of September 11 have left on the United States and on the American view of the world is shaping transatlantic relations. Those partners and institutions that are of relevance or of support in the current challenges will be at the center of US perception of this relationship. Those who remain indifferent or become cause for concern will move to the
margins of the relationship – to say the least. A new transatlantic agenda addressing the issues of the 21st Century is needed with long-term commitments from both sides of the Atlantic and a strong political will to implement this agenda. When acting together, the US and Europe need deeper relations than exist today. Windows of opportunity could be found in many issues: as the following list may show: Greater transparency, closer cooperation, and the sharing of intelligence; a conclusive security strategy; adequate burden sharing focusing on output-goals; effective means of cooperation between ESDP and NATO; ongoing common support for the stabilization of South Central Europe; re-engagement in the Middle East Peace Process; a common strategic approach to the second round of NATO enlargement.

Europe requires the attention and the normative power of American foreign policy. America needs the resources of the European economic power in order to flank its peace and security order – not just in the Middle East and in Africa but also in trouble spots in Asia and Latin America. To this end, Europe must be more strongly involved in negotiations on political settlements. Developing solutions to global challenges – be it the environment, migration or social and ethnic conflicts – is not about preserving the power of security policy. Anyone who wants to make a real contribution requires partners and coalitions. Together, Europe and the United States represent the ideal critical mass. Should the transatlantic partnership weaken, rivals of the West could play America and Europe off against one another, manipulating global competition between economic blocs. At a time when East Asia is unfolding its economic and demographic potential, such transatlantic rivalry would be damaging to both partners.

Internal dimension

Comprehensive security
The EU has realised that security policy will have to follow a comprehensive concept – September 11 has underlined that. A look at the non-military capabilities of EU external relations offers a broad range of instruments and policies available. However, what is still lacking is a strategic vision of the EU’s foreign policy. Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union defines the objectives of CFSP without reflecting a clear geopolitical thinking. The geographic extension of CFSP/ESDP needs to be clarified, which means to define whether the
The significance of this policy will be mainly concentrated on the enlarged EU’s closer neighbourhood or whether it is a policy with a global outreach.

CFSP/ESDP cannot be sufficiently developed without finding a satisfactory solution for how to improve the decision-making process. By offering a flexible instrument for accommodating the interests of pro-integrationist member states, enhanced co-operation can diminish the negative effects of possible blockages of classical decision-making procedures in an enlarged EU. Furthermore, effective decision-making and common external action may be increasingly difficult to achieve without moves towards at least the partial communitarization of CFSP.

Attempts to further communitarize CFSP must exclude the sensitive field of military affairs, to which the current and future member states attribute the high value of national sovereignty. Military crisis management as one branch of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy must not be linked with the term ‘communitarization’. Instead, matters of joint concern in the military sphere of ESDP should – for the time being – continue to be handled by means of intergovernmentalism. On the other hand, the traditional civilian aspects of the EU’s foreign policy, including non-military crisis management should be brought closer to the Community method as the resources necessary to implement them are to be found mainly in the area of today’s Community competences. Institutional developments alone will not suffice to enhance the EU’s role as a holistic international security actor. The Union will need to further develop its operational assets and capabilities. It is in this respect that the current and future member states of the EU will have to further intensify their efforts, streamline their overall military structures and increase both their national defence budgets and developmental aid spending if they want to live up to their own expectations.

Security in a comprehensive understanding implies, furthermore, that CFSP/ESDP cannot be limited to one pillar of the European treaty framework. On the contrary, there is a necessity for an overarching approach – which was further underlined following September 11 when Justice and Home Affairs became a central topic in the security debate. To close the gap between “common” and “intergovernmental” would thus imply the harmonisation of conflicting policy fields for a common interest. This will also touch those policy fields still
located in the third pillar. Similar to the case of CFSP, the distinct pillar containing the remaining aspects of cooperation of police and justice will in the end have to be abolished subsequently. However, if the EU is about to tackle the trans-border consequences of the freedom of movement in the common market, a full legislative participation of the European Parliament and a democratic scrutiny of executive actions should be guaranteed. The fight against terrorism must not weaken our basic values and rights. Thus, the democratic and understandable realization of an area of freedom, security and justice will be one task for the convention and the 2004 intergovernmental conference.

Enlargement

The necessity to adequately react to the challenges of international terrorism should not hamper developments of major European projects such as enlargement. On the contrary, the process should rather gain momentum than come to a halt. September 11 and its aftermath did not negatively affect the enlargement process. One cannot yet assess the impact of the fight against international terrorism on subsequent second or third rounds of enlargement. However, as the details of a next round of EU widening will become evident at the end of 2002 or early 2003, there will be a need to agree on a coherent and binding enlargement strategy.

The adoption of a quickly developing acquis on internal security constitutes a major challenge for the candidates’ already stretched police and judicial systems. The accession countries will have to strengthen their border-control efforts, share intelligence and information and increase their state capacity to track the movement of persons. The EU will have to help in developing institutional capacities and prove practical assistance, both human and financial. The fight against international terrorism requires to improve coherence and co-ordination between the EU’s external and internal security concerns. To achieve this, the Union should take into account the neighbourhood aspects of existing border regimes, visa and immigration policies when designing, implementing and revising common strategies on its direct neighbourhood in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Proposals on legislation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs should contain a “neighbourhood impact assessment” that considers the specific exposure of the accession countries and/or future new member states.
In an attempt to strengthen border controls on the enlarged EU’s new eastern borders, thought should be given to the idea to establish a European Border Guard, consisting of border guards from all member states who are specially trained to serve in joint missions. Such a European Border Guard needs to be based on the principles of equal partnership and reciprocity among new and old member states. With the fusion of the Single Market and the Schengen zone, there is a rationale to create a European Customs Service composed of customs officers from all member states. Through a joint institution, member states could share the financial burdens (and revenues), exercise a joint control and thus develop mutual confidence.

European integration beyond September 11
The reform of the European Union is linked to long-term projects. The effect of September 11 in the areas in question can only be to exert additional pressure to take action and to provide just one more argument for the necessity of efficient and democratically legitimated decision-making procedures. After decades of focusing on economic objectives, the EU, today, is more and more measured by its performance in basic duties of the state such as the guarantee of interior and exterior security, the realization of personal freedom, general prosperity and appropriate social conditions. The fact that these challenges had already been tackled before September 11 illustrates the magnitude of the ambitious integration projects initiated by the member states and the common institutions over the past few years. What September 11 meant for the reform of the political system of the EU can be described as an additional impetus for integration.
EXTERNAL DIMENSION

The Middle East and North Africa

September 11 and the American war on terrorism is bound to affect the Middle East and North African region deeply. As in the case of the Gulf crisis in 1990-91 and the subsequent war to liberate Kuwait, the international response to the attacks has the potential to trigger off a broad regional realignment. Some of the problems that were placed at the top of the international agenda in the wake of September 11 were familiar ones. However, the extent of the damage has decisively changed the way in which they are perceived and added a new sense of urgency. All of the countries in the region, with the exception of Iraq, condemned the attacks immediately. Yet, in contrast to the Gulf crisis, Arab governments were quick to point out that they were not prepared to play a military role in the emerging campaign against the terrorists and their hosts. Some linked the attacks to American foreign policy in the region, and emphasized that the war on terrorism should be confined to Afghanistan. Targeting any other country would lead to serious regional destabilisation.

Renewal of US engagement in the region

The Bush administration has come to the conclusion that the cost of consistent engagement in the region is lower than the cost of non-engagement. The direction and pressure of US policy will lead to significantly greater political costs, and this increases the importance of cost-benefit analysis for the region's governments, and the potential dangers. For the European Union, the redefinition of US foreign policy harbours the possibility of fostering new kinds of transatlantic co-operation in certain fields where interests converge and coincide.

Beyond Afghanistan, there are Somalia, Sudan and perhaps even Yemen as possible targets in a next phase of the American campaign, though perhaps only in terms of diplomatic pressure, for they are known to tolerate terrorist organisations on their soil. Their public institutions are fragile, have been weakened by civil war, and are both unable and unwilling to prevent terrorists from exploiting the power vacuum to operate training camps and maintain safe refuges.
Israeli-Palestinian peace process
The September 11 attacks have demonstrated the necessity of the long-term approach towards the Middle East and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process there will be either a long-term management of the conflict by settlement, or break up altogether, with serious implications for regional security. After several months of benign neglect September 11 did convince the Bush administration that it ought to play a more active role in the conflict although it reduced at the same time its tolerance for what was perceived as Palestinian terrorism. However, the new envoy Anthony Zinni proved unable to bring the bloody war of attrition between Israelis and Palestinians to an end. Even worse, the cycle of violence and counter-violence ultimately culminated in a large campaign of the Israeli army that led, at least temporarily, to the re-occupation of most autonomous Palestinian areas in the West Bank.

The negative effects of the smouldering conflict on the region and the international community as a whole are becoming increasingly clear. The visible plight of the Palestinians continues on an almost daily basis to fuel Arab anger at the attitude of the West, and serves as a welcome pretext for religious zealots. Yet, the collapse of the Camp David summit demonstrated that the US is unable to finalize a comprehensive agreement. What is needed is a strong, coordinated involvement of the main external actors, the US and the EU, in co-operation with other players such as Russia, Egypt, Jordan and the UN. This could take the form of a U.S.-EU working group on the Middle East, with representation at Secretary of State/Foreign Minister level. It would force EU countries to intensify co-ordination of their positions on the solution of the conflict, ultimately including those relating to final status issues. The implementation of the Mitchell proposals constitutes an important initial basis, but this can only be the first step. As stated in the Mitchell report, confidence-building measures cannot be sustained without a return to serious negotiations. An enduring cease-fire is only likely to be enforced if it is combined with the perspective of substantial progress in this field. One possibility would be to construct a piecemeal agreement by solving certain key questions, while relegating others to a later date. Another option might be the gradual implementation of a comprehensive agreement, including some "package deals" of the kind familiar from the European negotiating experience. The renewed negotiations should be based on proposals and ideas mooted between the time of Camp
The EU should be ready to take part in a monitoring force after a significant cooling-off period. With a clear mandate, and the cooperation of the parties with regard to its implementation, a peace-keeping force would have a positive effect.

Euro-Mediterranean partnership
The September 11 attacks have demonstrated the necessity of a long-term approach in the region to complement military action against the terrorist networks and their supporters. The terrorist attacks were perpetrated by Islamist terrorists of Arab background reflecting in many ways the profound crisis of the MENA region that expresses itself in a widespread use of religious and cultural identity as a mobilising resource. The cultural and religious revival in the MENA region is the manifestation of a deeper structural crisis. It reflects the failure of institutional arrangements and social structures in the face of a dynamic and evolving environment. The scenario of rapid social change and economic decline coupled with authoritarian institutions which are unable to cope with the challenge constitutes the breeding-ground of political Islam. The political mobilisation of religious values is not confined to Islam in general, or the Middle East in particular. Rather, it is a phenomenon that is just as global as modernisation or globalisation.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership established in 1995 is Europe’s institutional framework for fostering change throughout much of the region. Six years after initiating the process, it has still not come up with a success story, nor has it triggered off a broad transformation process in the southern Mediterranean partner countries. The lack of visible success is mainly due to the rather lukewarm manner in which the partners on both shores of the Mediterranean have embraced it. This is bound to change after September 11, for it is becoming increasingly clear that the external aspects of the socio-economic crisis in the southern Mediterranean pose a strategic rather than a tactical challenge to Europe. The EU should not devote its time to the futile search for an internationally accepted definition of terrorism, especially in the Mediterranean context, where in the public discourse the lines between terrorists, resistance fighters and opposition groups are blurred. Rather, the EU should embark on a pragmatic dialogue with Southern Mediterranean countries on an ad hoc basis to identify common concerns and co-ordinate policies in this field. The EU should ensure that the fight
against terrorism is not exploited by southern partner countries and used as a pretext for an indiscriminate attack on non-violent opposition groups, most of whom espouse some kind of Islamism. It must be remembered that the fight against terrorism involves the speedy arrest of suspects, and that this conflicts with the ongoing insistence on the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary systems in the Southern Mediterranean countries. Although many Western politicians have been at pains to stress that the war against terrorism is not a war against Islam in general, many in the region seem to think that it is. Such mutual demonisation must be resisted if the spirit of partnership invoked by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to be maintained. Thus it is of the utmost importance to start a frank cultural dialogue with the Southern Mediterranean countries to discuss mutual concerns and define shared values on different levels. Moderate Islamists should be included in this dialogue since they are the popular movement with the broadest mass base in most southern partner countries.

If the EU is serious about transforming the Mediterranean basin into a region of stability and prosperity, it will have to become far more involved in the transformation processes of the various countries. The EU should try to stimulate the socio-economic transformation of those countries which have already made some progress, thereby creating a “Mediterranean tiger” as a role model of successful development which others can copy. The EU should offer to enter into a comprehensive policy dialogue with Southern Mediterranean countries which have signed association agreements, thereby creating an “association partnership” that will eventually lead to a type of relationship that is much more than a mere association, though less than fully-fledged membership of the Union. The aim of such a partnership should be to reach agreement on a long-term reform programme which the EU would support with a substantial package of financial assistance.

The Gulf region
In the aftermath of September 11, Saudi-Arabia has come under intense criticism in the American public debate for the rather lukewarm support it has offered in the war against terrorism. Many observers are now having second thoughts about a friendly country which cloaks political interests in religious discourse, and finances innumerable charities with ties to fundamentalist networks. Saudi officials are afraid that there will be a strong domestic backlash
if the monarchy is identified too closely with US military action in the region. Even worse, most of the terrorists involved in the highjacking are believed to be Saudi nationals.

Given the paramount spiritual importance of Saudi-Arabia for hundreds of millions of Muslims all over the world, not to speak of its key role in global energy supply, there is an urgent need for Europe to reinforce its presence. The EU should rapidly improve its ties beyond the envisaged free-trade agreement aimed at supporting the political and economic development of the monarchy and its smaller partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council. The unfolding American campaign against terrorism and the swift way in which it succeeded in toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has strengthened those voices in the administration which are in favour of opening a second front against Iraq.

Since evidence linking Iraq to the al-Qaeda network is rather circumstantial, there has been a marked tendency in the administration to emphasize the danger of Iraq supplying weapons of mass destruction to future terrorist groups. If Iraq were to be attacked, the US would have to act without a sizeable international coalition, for the EU, including the United Kingdom, and America's allies in the region have expressed their strong opposition to such a move. Furthermore, any serious military action against Iraq would damage the new partnership with Russia which evolved after September 11, for Moscow maintains close economic and political ties with the Baghdad regime.

Instead of embarking on a risky strategy of military intervention in Iraq, the EU should move towards a swift implementation of and further evolution towards a regime where restrictions on - and delays to - Iraqi non-lethal imports are lifted. At the same time military controls must be kept in place, and some form of weapons of mass destruction monitoring needs to be re-established. Such a policy would also have a good chance of restoring some cohesion in the alliance, and of avoiding problems with, and within, friendly states in the region. Whilst Europeans and Americans agree that a change of regime in Iraq is desirable, how this should be achieved is a moot point. However, the EU and the United States should agree on a common agenda for a “post-Saddam” era in Iraq, regardless of when it comes about. It would be a good idea to outline the conditions under which an Iraqi government could be reintegrated into the international community and receive the support required for the reconstruction of its infrastructure.
The Balkans

Did September 11 change the strategies for the Balkan imbroglio? Several prominent pieces of evidence link the terrorist attacks to the Balkans and European policies for the Balkans. Some of the linkages are part of a broader shift in international politics (which may or may not predate the terror attacks), others relate specifically to the Balkans and European policies for the region. These linkages reach from transatlantic relations with their implications for Balkan policies to the implications for the on-going process of EU Eastern and (eventually) Southeastern enlargement and from the politics and rhetoric in the region itself to lessons learnt in the Balkans for the reconstruction and “transformation” of Afghanistan.

The transatlantic dimension of Balkan policies
The “War on Terror” has marked a geographic reorientation of US foreign policy. Although a tendency of “benign neglect” characterised the Balkan policies of the new Bush administration even prior to September 11, it has since become common understanding that the Balkans are first and foremost a burden for Europe to carry in context of a new transatlantic division of labour. The nascent European capabilities for military conflict-prevention and diplomatic crisis-management under CFSP and ESDP are thus in high demand. Already before September 11, the State Department had indicated that a follow-up mission in Macedonia ought to be a European endeavour, whereas the Pentagon proved unwilling to commit any additional forces to this peace-keeping operation. Currently, the only US soldier serving in Operation Amber Fox is a press officer, although American logistical and intelligence support is still crucial for the operation. Typically, in a first reaction on the dramatic events in New York and Washington, EU commissioner Chris Patten proclaimed the “hour of Europe”, foreseeing both a strong impulse for European integration in security and foreign policy as well as increased responsibilities within Europe and beyond. Short of a major new conflagration in the region, a US re-engagement in the Balkans is not to be expected. Rather, the gradual exit strategy predating September 11 will be implemented at an enhanced pace.

A wider Europe and (South)eastern enlargement of the EU
The debate on Muslim states (and state-like entities) in Europe and their inclusion in a future enlarged European Union has acquired a new dimension. This debate concerns not only Turkey,
the thirteenth candidate for EU membership since the 1999 Helsinki European Council, but also
the Western Balkans and their status of potential candidacy for EU membership. Thus,
September 11 may have long-term consequences for the concept of Europe and its identity as
either an open union or a Western bulwark. Apart from the question of the territorial limits of a
European finalité, the threat of destabilisation also redefines the trade-off between speed and
quality, between stability and conditionality in the parallel processes of EU and NATO
enlargement. Prior to the Kosovo War, no analyst would have given Romania and Bulgaria a
ghost of a chance to open negotiations on EU accession. Yet, the Helsinki European Council of
December 1999 opened negotiations with six more countries and offered Turkey the formal
status of EU candidate. Similarly, the War on Terror may have a distinct impact on the parallel
processes of NATO and EU enlargement. Prior to September 11, Slovakia and Slovenia (maybe
Lithuania) was the best guess for the next round of NATO enlargement to be decided in Prague
in late 2002. So far many consider a 19+7 scenario (including Romania and Bulgaria) a
neglectable conclusion. Conversely, the European Union is preparing the ground for a “big
bang” scenario, including all ten East European accession states except Romania and Bulgaria.
This scenario would reinstate the classical “Balkans” (in contrast to the “Western Balkans” as a
1998 neologism in EU-speak) as a European region of potential and real instability, even though
Romania and Bulgaria would still be EU candidates after a 2004 round of enlargement, whereas
the five other countries would have to be content with “a EU perspective.”

At the same time, the international community and its regional partners have been
alerted to the risks of terrorism in the Balkans and will increase their efforts to combat both the
actual terrorists and the structural root causes (weak states, corruption and organised crime).
Such shifting policy priorities will become noticeable in international frameworks and strategies
for the region. Thus, Justice and Home Affairs would be a key policy area in a possible strategy
of differentiated EU integration for Southeastern Europe. In the long run, an island of instability
and a safe haven for terrorists within a continental pax europeana is not acceptable.

Taliban connections in the Balkans
Since Islamic terrorism has become a pivotal issue in the media worldwide, long reports and
allegations concerning connections between Islamic “regimes” in the Balkans and the Taliban or
the al-Qa’ida network of Bin Laden began to appear in the local and the world press. Apart from
the Islam factor, fragile political structures, extensive possibilities for criminal activities and insufficient border controls constitute competitive advantages of the Balkans for terrorists looking for a foothold in Europe. Therefore, too much excitement over Bosnia as a “Trojan horse” in Western security seems inappropriate, but with the current frenzy of security measures in the USA and Europe, the Western Balkans may gain additional importance for terrorist networks in Europe. Paradoxically, the most effective countermeasure may well be a consistent and intensive continuation of the current peace-building process. Yet, the international community and the neighbouring European Union in particular will face the challenge of having to improve security and surveillance in this unstable region too. In this context, the US action of arm-twisting of the Bosnian authorities to hand over several al-Qaeda suspects in January to Guantanamo Bay without much concern for legal procedure or civil rights infuriated human-rights groups and is bound to preoccupy the European forces taking over police duties in Bosnia next year.

Nevertheless, former foreign “mercenaries” who decided to settle in Bosnia after the Dayton Agreement are more relevant for the region than highly educated “sleepers” matching the FBI profile of the September 11 terrorists. For the time being, moreover, the media hype on real or alleged connections between local Muslim groups and Islamic fundamentalism seems more relevant than their actual numbers and intentions. True or false, these reports are used in regional and domestic politicking, but most of all to influence the international choice of policy options for the region by instrumentalizing the catchword “terrorism.” The accusation of “terrorism” thus acquires a new urgency and quality within the region and most of all in its competition for international preference and allegiance.

The argument by Belgrade and Skopje that they stand for law and order, constituting bulwarks of stability and state sovereignty may touch a nerve in Western capitals in the near future. All the more so as their opponents in Pristina or Tetovo can easily be portrayed as rebels, extremists and terrorists. Apart from a certain ambiguity in dealing with Muslim states in Europe, another obvious reflex might be a preference for stronger, well-functioning states in the region, adding to the already existing reluctance to see new, fragile states in a further downward spiral of regional fragmentation and destabilisation – a breeding ground for terrorism. Nevertheless, in view of the structural and long-term approach of the European Stabilisation
and Association Process for the region, crude attempts to influence presumed preferences for certain countries of nations are not likely to succeed. Local crises like Tetovo or Presevo may temporarily overrule the conditionality of the European “pre-pre-accession” strategy, but neither Albanians nor Serbs can claim a special status as guarantors of regional stability or victims of regional conflicts. The crisis in the Presevo valley drove this point home for the Albanians, the crisis of the Macedonian state contained some clear signs for the neighbouring nations and states.

Lessons learnt in the Balkans
The first question, however, will be whether the recent successes of the European Balkan strategy combining crisis management and military presence with reconstruction and reform assistance might serve as a model for a post-Taliban Afghanistan. A “Balkan model” or a “stability pact for Afghanistan,” however, might be a fallacy. Quite apart from the fragility of the stabilisation of the Balkans after the demise of the Milosevic regime (demonstrated by the unresolved Tetovo conflict, stopped just short of a civil war), the transferability of the Balkan strategy is highly doubtful. The promise of a (long-term) perspective of EU accession gives the states and nations of the Balkans a common objective they never had before. It also gives Brussels the leverage needed to push and guide unpopular reform processes and to stimulate economic development and political democratisation in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process. Nothing similar is remotely conceivable for Afghanistan: The non-interference of its neighbours so far is largely based on military pressure and ad-hoc coalition-building rather than a common objective or perspective of regional integration.

Moreover, despite the virulence of the ethnic and territorial conflicts in the Balkans, state sovereignty is and remains the highest goal: Minorities may strive for maximum autonomy or even independence, but state and nation building will be at the core of their program too. It has become common practice to refer to the Balkans as a conglomerate of “weak or failing states,” despite the fact that all governments have been elected democratically, have substantial sovereignty over the state’s territory and have been accepted as legitimate rulers by most of the populace. They only tend to fail in the conceptualisation and implementation of highly ambitious projects of modernisation and integration. Conversely, for at least the past twenty years Afghanistan has not seen any ruler seriously concerned with any sovereignty based on
more than military force and control over strategic locations. A civic concept of state and nationhood, integrating different ethnic and religious groups in a state legitimised by its functionality and output, seems utterly unthinkable in the Afghan imbroglio. Openness and the density of civic networks constitute both the strength and the vulnerability of highly developed Western societies, whereas pre-modern regimes with no sustainable policies of economic or infrastructure development or even democratic legitimisation derive their strength from modern military technology, their imperviousness from the possibility to withdraw to the mountains if necessary. Thus, the key premises of European stabilisation policies for the Balkans are missing in the case of Afghanistan. Whereas the Balkan model may not be transferable, the key lesson learnt in that region over the past ten years, however, may remain valid. Without an equally substantial and determined program of humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction and political stabilisation, no military intervention - no matter how massive - can produce long-term stability and security. The political will and stamina of the international community to stimulate and guide processes of stabilisation and sustainable development for years and decades on end will be decisive.

Apart from the reorientation of US and European attention, possibly to the detriment of the Balkans in terms of human and financial resources, the aftermath of September 11 also constitutes a challenge for post-conflict stabilisation strategies in general. During the war in Afghanistan, the USA and its European allies agreed on a combination of military power and humanitarian aid. In the implementation of the Bonn Agreement, the diverging American and European philosophies of stabilisation and modernisation as well as the balancing of hard and soft power projection are bound to reappear. In the aftermath of the bombing, the US aversion against peace-keeping missions and comprehensive post-conflict strategies already reappeared.

These policy preferences are reminiscent of Balkan exit strategies and a division of labour between US warfare and European post-war reconstruction. If the currently dominant trend towards short-lived strategic alliances and exit-strategies persists, European policies for the Balkans - so far based on a regional approach of intensive dialogue and perspectives of stabilisation and integration - may eventually be affected by proxy.
Russia

Russia’s President Putin was the first foreign leader to express sympathy and solidarity with the United States following the attacks on New York and Washington. Using the hotline established between the two superpowers during the Cold War, Putin said “Russia is with America” and against the terrorists. Based on this position, Russia contributed several kinds of support for the Western military action in Afghanistan, and an air corridor for the flights of American aircraft was provided. Furthermore, Russia stands in for American interests in its Central Asian Alliances and supports the West with intelligence information. In addition to supporting the US, Russia also acts in its own direct interests, particularly in Central Asia and the Caucasus where it has to prevent potential terrorist threats.

Apart from military and strategic action, Putin has been opening new windows of opportunity for relations between Russia and the West. Russia’s short-term signals surprised the international community, but in the half year that has followed, the long-term tasks have come increasingly into focus. Putin’s most significant foreign address on both short and long-term developments was his speech given in the German Bundestag on 25 September 2001 in Berlin. He started by highlighting the worldwide background to the tragedy of September 11 and continued with the need to build a new security architecture. In doing this, he suggested strengthening European integration but also thinking in a wider, i.e. pan-European security context. Russia’s clear support for the US and Putin’s declaration of the end of the Cold War surprised the Western world. At the same time most of the Russian political elite is critically astonished about Putin’s current position. One has to ask how far and by whom the President is supported, whether he is expressing his own power over other actors and influence groups, or whether he is under serious pressure from his opponents. Furthermore, the immediate cooperation on strategic aspects, like providing the air corridor, is no guarantee of a strategic and sustainable partnership. Some doubts should be considered about the support for Putin among the Russian elite and public opinion.

Russia’s new strategic approaches
Taking lessons from history seriously, one has to consider that East and West have collaborated before under the pressure of common enemies and threats, but, for instance, after the end of
World War II co-operation turned very quickly into the new confrontation of the Cold War. Furthermore, at least some doubts should be considered about the support for Putin among the Russian elite. The strongest criticism is formulated by Communist and/or Nationalist representatives, who are comparing Putin with Yeltsin or Gorbachev. Beyond radical positions, even analysts and politicians who usually support Putin are much more sceptical now. Even if they do not criticise, they have started to brick up the new windows of opportunity with wish lists for compensation. The list starts with understanding Russia's military action in Chechnya. The bombing of apartment buildings in Moscow and other Russian cities in summer 2000 is once more propagated as a terrorist attack from the Caucasus, even if any kind of official proof is still missing. The intervention in Chechnya is portrayed as fighting against terrorism, and the West should support it instead of constantly criticising Moscow. Other analysts assess the close co-operation between Russia and the West as a tactical policy which will not lead to any new medium-term strategic alliances.

Even if Putin's position is not shared by all members of the Russian elite, he is supported by reform oriented representatives. They mostly share the position of a new window of opportunity of Russia's external relations and internal development. Under this assumption, the EU is of growing importance for Russia and the events of September 11 have an impact on almost all areas of co-operation between Russia and the European Union.

Security partnership
Since starting to widen its perception of the EU from a purely economic player to a political actor, Russia has been interested in security co-operation with the European Union. The intention is connected with Russia's concept of a multilateral world order. In this concept, the EU is seen as an alternative to a US-dominated world. Therefore, the Russian government has been welcoming the strengthening of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, but did not agree with the western security concept that strengthening European security and defence co-operation is part of transatlantic co-operation. Even before September 11 the US refused to participate directly in the NATO operations in Macedonia. As an indirect consequence of September 11, one should assume decreasing American involvement in European conflicts. Therefore Western Europe has a need to establish a new security partnership with Russia to
cooperate in preventing and fighting regional conflicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the western part of the CIS.

Putin-oriented statements and official action after September 11 suggest that Russia is no longer interested in a multilateral world order, but is part of the international anti-terrorist operation. Once more Putin’s speech in the German Bundestag can be mentioned as a signal for overcoming the legacies of the Cold War and proclaiming Russia an ally of the West. This also includes close co-operation or even membership in western organizations, not excluding NATO. In addition to NATO issues, Russian positions are also focusing on strengthening the European Security and Defence Policy, as well as increasing security co-operation between Russia and the EU. The new goals of security co-operation were part of the EU-Russia summit in Brussels in October 2001. The output fixed in a “Joint declaration on stepping up dialogue and co-operation on political and security matters” opens opportunities for Russian participation in civilian and military crisis management operations of the European Union Defence and Security Policy. Furthermore a statement on mutual co-operation to combat international terrorism in compliance with the international law and the UN Charter was signed. Russia’s requirement to strengthen the ESDP should be considered as an opportunity for deepening EU integration.

Partnership of modernization
If Russia keeps the door open to being a western country, it has the opportunity to transform itself from a historically great power to a prosperous European nation. This transformation would decide a fundamental Russian debate about self-definition between being a superpower on the one hand or being a successful modern state on the other. If the reaction to September 11 leads to the latter approach, Russia’s future development will further co-operation with Europe.

The European Union and its member states fulfil several conditions for a modernisation partnership. The EU is customer number one for Russian exports, and with about 40 percent amount of foreign direct investment, the EU member states are the biggest direct investors in Russia. The Union is also the largest provider of technical assistance to Russia. Furthermore, supporting the Central and East European candidates states through the combination of impending membership and rule-setting for internal development from the outside is a unique success story for stabilising transition processes. If Russia is setting new goals for its transition,
the Union should use these experiences to stabilise internal Russian developments. Potentially, the EU policies of the technical assistance program TACIS and the humanitarian aid office ECHO can be adopted to the additional requirements. The recently adopted EU Country Strategy Paper 2000-2006 and National Indicative Programme 2002-2003 for the Russian Federation include some important areas of further technical assistance for Russia. By identifying areas of cooperation such as administrative reform, civil society development, deregulation, corporate governance and social reform, the approach goes far beyond the Washington Consensus based on supporting liberalisation and privatisation at the beginning of the 1990s. In evaluating the capacity of the EU’s technical assistance to Russia, one should also take into consideration the comparatively low amount of resources budgeted. Since 1991, when the EU set priorities in its external relations and its function as a soft security provider, the Union has provided € 6.2 billion in technical assistance to the Balkans and only € 1.5 billion to Russia.

Economic partnership
The events of September 11 are also a new impulse for economic cooperation between Russia and the EU. This very area was the beginning of Russia’s cooperation with the EU. The Union is the most important trade partner for Russia, and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in July 1994 already contained the option of a European free trade area. The trade relations between Russia and the European Union are dominated by Russian energy exports. On the one hand this trade structure is of mutual interest; but on the other hand strengthening the energy-based economy allows Russia to postpone further modernisation.

September 11 has an additional impact on Russian-European economic relations. At the Brussels summit in October 2001 Russia and the European Union declared the creation of a Common European Economic area. The guidelines are restricted to the idea of bringing EU and Russia closer together, to removing obstacles to trade, investment and transit and to paving the way for negotiations on Russian WTO accession. A clear concept of designing a common European economic area is still missing, but nevertheless extending security related cooperation towards a widespread partnership might be a fresh impulse. Taking into consideration requirements of Russian modernisation, the economic relationship should go beyond energy exports from Russia to Europe.
From tactical cooperation to sustainable partnership

In order to define the impact of September 11 on EU-Russian relations one should consider three aspects. First of all, the internal Russian discussion has been dominated by US and NATO related issues; second, the discussion is not finished; and finally, Putin in his clearly post-Cold War styled policy is not being supported by all Russian decision makers and analysts.

The crucial question remains to what extent the consequences of September 11 will go further than single-issue short-term action toward impulses to strengthen integration and cooperation between East and West. Taking into account all the threats and challenges to Russia’s current position, the most important task is to transform tactical co-operation in sustainable partnerships between Russia, Europe and the United States. These partnerships have to be based on a large number of actors and cannot be limited to security-related issues. At this very point the problem of belonging to different kinds of societies plays a significant factor, and the alliance can by no means be limited to common security interests. While Western societies are consolidated democracies, market economies and pluralistic civil societies, Russia is still under transition from authoritarian rule toward Western modernisation and pluralism.

The current situation can be best described as a window of opportunity. If Russia continues its policy of becoming a modern European country, the EU is challenged to take on a growing function. In the fields of modernisation and economic co-operation, the EU is already a strong actor - its role as a security and defence provider still has to be improved. While September 11 has already had some considerable consequences for relations between Russia and the West, even after six months it is still too early to assess the lasting impact on EU-Russia relations. Future developments depend on Russia’s strategic choice for further modernisation and the EU’s capacity and capability of being a security and defence actor in the international arena.
United States - The transatlantic dimension

The deep impact the events of September 11 have left on the United States and on the American view of the world is shaping transatlantic relations. Those partners and institutions that are of relevance or of support in the current challenges will be at the center of US perception of this relationship. Those who remain indifferent or become cause for concern will move to the margins of the relationship - to say the least.

This watershed of perceptions does not even exclude institutions such as NATO, the cornerstone of American engagement in Europe. For years, “going global” had been the catchword for the changes ahead, much supported and called for by US policy makers. When a situation arose which - by definition - transcended the territorial principle, and when NATO's members for the first time invoked Article 5 of the treaty, NATO became marginalized. The autonomy of American military action turned out to be more relevant than the inclusion of the alliance as an actor. Likewise, the changing nature of transatlantic relations affects Europe and the European members of NATO. The European efforts to introduce synergy to crisis management and rapid reaction were proven irrelevant by the consequences of September 11. If NATO was not the appropriate place for preparing and implementing the US response, then the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) seemed to be unattractive to the EU’s principal actors.

Both the US and the Europeans enter into a new phase of their relationship guided by conclusions from recent experience, which will most likely be of formative significance but may at the same time not reflect appropriately the longer-term interests of the powers involved. This applies to the instrumental approach of the US to multilateralism and its institutions as much as for the Europeans and their lukewarm approach to ESDP.

Issues of transatlantic engagement
A new transatlantic agenda addressing the issues of the 21st Century is needed with long-term commitments from both sides of the Atlantic and a strong political will to implement this agenda. September 11 has put the notion of an Atlantic Community back on the radar screens of Western politics. Besides the sobering perceptions referred to above, the challenges ahead
inspire reflections on an agenda of cooperation and joint action. When acting together, the US and Europe need deeper relations than exist today. Windows of opportunity could be found in many issues, as the following list may show:

- Greater transparency, closer cooperation, and the sharing of intelligence are prerequisites in the fight against organized crime, trafficking, and the identification of terrorist activities at an early stage;
- A conclusive security strategy, including anti-proliferation strategies and counter-terror policies towards third countries;
- Adequate burden sharing focusing on output-goals rather than on input figures such as defense spending;
- Effective means of cooperation between ESDP and NATO - in the light of current events, the former US conditionality of “no duplication, no discrimination, no decoupling” seems rather outdated;
- Ongoing common support for the stabilization of South Central Europe;
- Re-engagement in the Middle East Peace Process;
- A common strategic approach to the second round of NATO enlargement.

With these issues in mind, the potential of “positive engagement” across the Atlantic comes to light. In many ways, the current war against terror replicates the method of negative community building - negative in the sense of defining one’s commonness as a function of an outside threat. Fundamentalist Islamic terrorism seems unlikely to dominate the Western agenda for longer than a phase. There is no political ideology capable of challenging the model of pluralist democracy on a worldwide scale. The fundamentalist trends in the Islamic world, the ethno-ideologies and the movements led by charismatic figures appear antagonistic in character but are mostly focused on the respective home audiences. They do not have the power to pose a military threat to the West but could disrupt the increasingly interdependent economic processes.

In terms of its regulatory policy, the West is presented with the opportunity to shape developments in an active manner and to go further than merely reacting to prevent danger. This opportunity brings with it both challenges and risks since it requires a well-functioning
pluralist form of democracy that is not dependent on external pressure to take action, to mobilize resources and to enter into alliances.

Interdependent unilateralism?
Western civilization constitutes the foundation on which the unprecedented globalization of production and trade, financial markets and services is based. The physical dimensions of this interdependence have now outgrown its socio-cultural origins, but the political mechanisms of control and regulation in Western societies have failed to develop at the same pace. A colorful set of protest movements reminds policy makers on every major summit that an adequate level of action for the safeguarding and further development of social goods does not yet exist. More than other spheres of world politics, the Western states are committed to international cooperation and supranational integration, yet the social foundation and social acceptance of this policy are not proceeding at the same pace. This is what causes policy makers to respond to the globalization of challenges with regional integration. Yet the steps taken still require legitimization at national level. Problem solving, decision-making and legitimization must all be brought together at one level. At the same time, the need to assert oneself in a world that is growing ever smaller places pressure on the West to modernize itself.

The regulatory blueprints in Europe and America are in competition with one another and with alternatives in other regions of the world. This rivalry could be converted into an opportunity for mutual learning. Instead, the patterns of reaction seem to diverge rather than to converge: While the issues of global economic integration are addressed through a variety of multilateral forums, challenges to the security of Western societies prompt national responses. Bridging this gap requires a more intensive transatlantic dialogue: Europe and America share a deeper interdependence than is suggested by the current patterns of their asymmetric relationship.

Burden sharing and power sharing
America must mean more to Europe than simply compensating for European shortcomings, representation of interests or security. The will and the means to assert oneself are the preconditions for the creation of a community with a positive rationale. In order to realize and to secure their objectives, the Europeans require a partnership with the Americans:
Creating a new European order in accordance with the rules of European integration needs the support of the United States. Hesitance and ambiguities on the American side undercut the difficult process of joint European commitments towards a meaningful European security and defense capability.

Developing and protecting the standards needed for pluralistic democracy and for market economics during the process of transformation in East Central Europe means more than just adhering to the community acquis. Europe requires the attention and the normative power of American foreign policy.

After the shock of September 11, Europe is more vulnerable and more exposed than the United States. Players and conflict situations of crucial importance for the future of the international system are close at hand.

Without the transatlantic partnership the danger is that stagnation will set in and that the process of European unity will falter when faced with what are inevitable burdens and risks. European politics need America's confidence in order to realize their most ambitious objectives. On the other hand, Europe is not simply a beneficiary of US engagement. Its significance to the United States of America cannot lie in seconding American superpower politics. The sharing of burdens and responsibility and a partnership between equals is the prerequisite for the transatlantic community in the future. The USA, as the truly global power, needs Europe, as an emerging power, which despite its cultural, historical and political diversity is capable of representing its interests and making best use of its combined resources.

In terms of world politics, American power politics need to share the burden with such a Europe. It will not be possible to stabilize Russia without a European contribution to cooperation and integration. A similar assumption will develop with regard to China. Confronting the new threats by terrorist action from within the West will require intensive cooperation, including advancements along the lines of integration.

America needs the resources of the European economic power in order to flank its peace and security order - not just in the Middle East and in Africa but also in trouble spots in Asia and Latin America. To this end, Europe must be more strongly involved in negotiations on political settlements.
• Developing solutions to global challenges – be it the environment, migration or social and ethnic conflicts – is not about preserving the power of security policy. Anyone who wants to make a real contribution requires partners and coalitions. Together, Europe and the United States represent the ideal critical mass.

• Should the transatlantic partnership weaken, rivals of the West could play America and Europe off against one another, manipulating global competition between economic blocs. At a time when East Asia is unfolding its economic and demographic potential, such transatlantic rivalry would be damaging to both partners.

A new order in international politics, standards in peacefulness and the balancing out of interests and a conflict prevention strategy do not arise from coalitions convened on an ad-hoc basis. These goals are pursued and upheld in a credible manner by visible communities of allies. Otherwise, they can be revoked by calculated acts of aggression at any time. Europe and America are the only two remaining reliable guarantors of stability in the world. Consequently, their willingness to resolve situations and their capability of achieving results are being put to the test on a daily basis, even in regions and areas where the existing organs of transatlantic cooperation have no jurisdiction.

Many of the existing problem-solving approaches can still only be put into practice if the burden is shared. A high level of political liaison and the appropriate close network of communication structures are necessary – the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 with its loose mechanisms for consultation has failed to deliver the strategic link across the Atlantic. With the establishment of the position of the High Representative, the phone number that Henry Kissinger was missing has eventually been assigned but no effective pooling of the political power of Europe has taken place. The new troika system does not yet dispose of the same clout as the continuing patterns of diplomacy shown by the large European states. As long as their ambitions and resources do not find adequate roles in providing external leadership to the EU, an Atlantic Political Community can hardly emerge.
NATO a defunct military alliance
Afghanistan and the war against terror once again reaffirm that, as a purely military alliance, NATO has no future. In addition, the contractual foundation of this political alliance lacks any clear definition of its future content. NATO's plausibility lies in its role as an "alliance of democracies" bringing together Europe and North America and open to all the democracies of the European continent. No European state which is admitted to the EU could be refused access to NATO if it wants to become a member. Should this link be broken, the compatibility of Western institution building would be lost. Without the development of a visible defense capability, the Europeans will not succeed in convincing the United States that they are extending their commitments within the Alliance.

The European Union, in particular the larger Member States, must find the willingness and the ability to protect their Western interests and to act jointly with the United States outside Europe. This requires a more sophisticated security concept and may need a reversal of approaches: So far, crisis management and rapid reaction in Europe are considered a joint or common task while territorial defense remains a national privilege. With a view to the current difficulties with ESDP on the one hand, and in light of the many duplications in the field of ground defense forces on the other hand, much could be gained if at least a number of European states built a common territorial defense structure.

Nowhere is the degree of transatlantic interdependence and the potential of future cooperation more visible than in economic relations. Economically, Europe and the USA are the two most closely bound regions in the world. The potential of transatlantic economic relations is such that, also bearing in mind the challenges from the Far East, there is a need for new regulatory mechanisms. Given the unprecedented level of economic interdependence and a consensus on economic power, regulatory policy and understanding of market economics, the development of a common transatlantic market is long overdue.

Already, a large proportion of bilateral trade takes place free of any restrictions, but major exceptions remain, e.g. non-tariff trade barriers. This is why Americans and Europeans should agree on a continuous liberalization initiative designed to accelerate the implementation of WTO rulings, to create a joint basis for the consequences of open markets, to prepare the
development of international standards and to agree on the essentials of their economic regulatory policy. Such an approach could be an interim stage on the road to a transatlantic single market guaranteeing the free movement of goods, capital, services and persons.

The combination of perspectives in the fields of economy, society and security as sketched out briefly in the above, demonstrates the peculiar nature of the link between Europe and the United States, even when and while choosing to act independently of each other. Friedrich Schiller's William Tell, in one of his famous lines, states that the strong one is most powerful alone ... a profound misunderstanding as it turns out - and not to be repeated in the transatlantic relationship of the future.
INTERNAL DIMENSION

Foreign and security policy: more than CFSP/ESDP

While EU activities were developed in reaction to September 11, questions arose concerning the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): Is it necessary to re-assess the concept of the CFSP/ESDP?

Several aspects need considering:

- First of all, a general scepticism regarding the EU’s foreign and security political capabilities. Examples pointing at a lack of capabilities are numerous and can be found on the level of the EU member states, on the supranational level with respect to the role of the institutions involved, on the side of third countries, in media comments as well as in the academic debate.

- Second, the EU’s role as a crisis manager in the Afghanistan conflict raised doubts about the coherence and strength of European foreign policy. For example, at the same time that the EU Troika was on a diplomatic mission in Islamic countries, the British foreign minister undertook his own initiatives. In the past, such a parallelism of European diplomacy was often criticised due to its weakening effects on the perception of the EU as a coherent foreign policy actor. This time, the argument runs in favour of parallel initiatives, i.e. additional activities by one or more member states are perceived as strengthening European foreign policy – based on the assumption, of course, that a common interest is expressed.

- Third, a further reason for scepticism is related to the results of the Capabilities Improvement Conference of November 2001. If there ever was a certain euphoria concerning the military capabilities that should be made available by EU and non-EU states to achieve the headline goal, the results of the Capability Improvement Conference speak in favour of a more sober analysis. There is need for stronger efforts concerning military forces, e.g. protection of forces deployed, commitment capability and logistics, and concerning strategic capabilities, e.g. command, control, communications and intelligence resources (C3I). To remedy these shortcomings, the member states agreed on a European Capability Action Plan; nonetheless, one should not expect the existing problems to be satisfactorily solved in a short period of time. The controversial debate within and amongst EU member states on the purchase of the A400M military transport
aircraft indicated, as one example, that the EU still has a long way to go before being capable of handling military operations embracing all levels of the Petersberg tasks.

The Spanish EU presidency was confronted with a comprehensive mandate to further develop CFSP/ESDP. But to find the necessary agreement between the interests involved demands time. In order to avoid frustration, it will be important to accept a longer-term perspective. Could EU forces be able to carry out full Kosovo-type operations without recourse to US assets by 2015? Would it be possible, in a period from 2015-2030, to achieve a progressive transfer of national decision-making, command and control competencies into a common structure, in which qualified majority voting in some form would be the rule within a common legal framework?

Apart from accepting the above mentioned time dimension, the EU has realised that security policy will have to follow a comprehensive concept - September 11 has underlined that. A look at the non-military capabilities of EU external relations offers a broad range of instruments and policies available. However, what is still lacking is a strategic vision of the EU’s foreign policy. Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union defines the objectives of CFSP without reflecting a clear geopolitical thinking. Because of the high degree of global interdependence the EU is facing as a leading economic and trade political power, and in accordance with the objectives laid down in Article 11 TEU, the political, economic and societal stability of regions, no matter how near or far, is an essential interest of the EU. Therefore, the geographic extension of CFSP/ESDP needs to be clarified, which means to define whether the significance of this policy will be mainly concentrated on the enlarged EU’s closer neighbourhood or whether it is a policy with a global outreach. This implies asking whether it seems possible to think of Petersberg tasks when talking about distant regions, as for example Asia.

CFSP/ESDP cannot be sufficiently developed without finding a satisfactory solution for how to improve the decision-making process. By offering a flexible instrument for accommodating the interests of pro-integrationist member states, enhanced co-operation can diminish the negative effects of possible blockages of classical decision-making procedures in an enlarged EU. Furthermore, effective decision-making and common external action may be increasingly difficult to achieve without moves towards at least the partial communitarization of
CFSP. Additionally, in an attempt to overcome the outmoded pillar structure and in the light of the growing need to link internal and external policy tools, pressure toward moving the field of foreign and security policies closer to the Community method will increase.

Attempts to further communitarize CFSP must exclude the sensitive field of military affairs, to which the current and future member states attribute the high value of national sovereignty. Military crisis management as one branch of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy must not be linked with the term ‘communitarization’. Instead, matters of joint concern in the military sphere of ESDP should – for the time being – continue to be handled by means of intergovernmentalism. On the other hand, the traditional civilian aspects of the EU’s foreign policy, including non-military crisis management should be brought closer to the Community method as the resources necessary to implement them are to be found mainly in the area of today’s Community competences. In this respect, the role of the European Commission with regard to non-military elements of CFSP should be reinforced. That the Commission has pledged itself to non-military crisis management seems reasonable and in accordance with the logic of EU external relations. But if the coherence of military and non-military measures should be ensured and the non-military capabilities and capacities put comprehensively to use, the Commission must be granted an even stronger role.

The competences of the Commissioner responsible for external relations would have to be increased accordingly and co-operation between his office and the office of the High Representative for the CFSP would have to be linked more closely in order to create synergy effects and to counteract an emerging institutional competition. In the search for a face and voice for EU foreign policy it will prove imperative that third states can recognise a continuously present and active representative who is able to rely on the support of the member states.

The question of legitimacy is of central importance for promoting acceptance of the CFSP among EU citizens. In addition to the primary role accorded to national parliaments, it is therefore necessary to involve the European Parliament in all non-military aspects, thus providing for a double legitimation. Its participation should be guaranteed not only by the EP’s right for its view to be taken into consideration and its right to be regularly informed, but it ultimately requires the EP’s parliamentary assent.
In an effort to further strengthen the efficiency of the EU’s foreign and security policy dimension it is worth striving in a mid-term perspective for more qualified majority voting in the Council concerning the non-military aspects of CFSP/ESDP. The right of initiative would have to remain with the member states. However, it should also be bestowed upon the High Representative and the Commission.

Institutional developments alone will not suffice to enhance the EU’s role as a holistic international security actor. The Union will need to further develop its operational assets and capabilities. It is in this respect that the current and future member states of the EU will have to further intensify their efforts, streamline their overall military structures and increase both their national defence budgets and developmental aid spending if they want to live up to their own expectations.

To sum up, enhanced cooperation in its present form needs to be transformed into a concept that will lead to a far-reaching communitarization of CFSP for two motives:

- to strengthen and extend the foreign, security and (ultimately) defence political capabilities of the EU;
- to avoid that ad hoc coalition building, which does not respect the agreed institutional and legal framework of the EU, becomes the typical pattern for crisis management.

Comprehensive security includes justice and home affairs

Security in a comprehensive understanding implies, furthermore, that CFSP/ESDP cannot be limited to one pillar of the European treaty framework. On the contrary, there is a necessity for an overarching approach – which was further underlined following September 11 when Justice and Home Affairs became a central topic in the security debate. To close the gap between “common” and “intergovernmental” would thus imply the harmonisation of conflicting policy fields for a common interest. This will also touch those policy fields still located in the third pillar.

The aspect of Justice and home affairs will become an even more important part of European foreign and security policy post September 11. Specific measures have been agreed on
in response to the challenge of terrorism. In general the EU intends to create an area of freedom, security and justice by 2004. The consequences of this are equally far-reaching as in the case of the Common Market. Common guidelines in asylum, visa and migration policies and the establishment of Europol and Eurojust would be sufficient to reach a new step in the process of integration. Additional projects like the establishment of a European force for border controls, a further development of Eurojust into a public prosecutors’ office with specific rights to investigate in member states and the extension of the operative rights of Europol are already evolving and they all fit into the logic of a common area of interior security.

Similar to the case of CFSP, the distinct pillar containing the remaining aspects of cooperation of police and justice will in the end have to be abolished subsequently. However, if the EU is about to tackle the trans-border consequences of the freedom of movement in the common market, a full legislative participation of the European Parliament and a democratic scrutiny of executive actions should be guaranteed. It is here that the charter of basic rights will have to play a decisive role. It should protect citizens from interferences by common institutions in their rights. The European Court of Justice should guarantee the legal security required. As this field affects citizens directly, special attention should be paid to the separation of duties between member states and the EU. The fight against terrorism must not weaken our basic values and rights. Thus, the democratic and understandable realization of an area of freedom, security and justice will be one task for the convention and the 2004 intergovernmental conference.

Enlargement
The implications of the terrorist attacks of September 11 on EU enlargement need to be analysed with regard to two particular sets of questions:

- How might the fight against international terrorism affect the timing of a next round of EU widening?
- How will changes to the Union's acquis especially in the field of Justice and Home Affairs affect the conditions under which new members join the EU?
Effects on the timing
As an immediate reaction to the events of September 11 the European Commission and representatives of the candidate countries stressed the importance of EU enlargement for the sake of security and stability on the continent. The enlargement process and especially the timing of a next round of EU widening should not be negatively affected. The necessity to adequately react to the challenges of international terrorism should not hamper developments of major European projects such as enlargement. On the contrary, the process should rather gain momentum than come to a halt.

On the other hand, the impact of the terrorist attacks had the potential to slow down enlargement. Considerations were expressed that enlargement efforts might move far down the list of immediate priorities for EU-15 governments. Moreover, worldwide economic recession following September 11 might have the potential to negatively influence public opinion towards major European projects, not at least towards enlargement – especially since during crisis situations people seem more cautious about large projects. Economic recession might even burden EU accession talks, which were about to enter their final phase. Moreover, due to the undeniable correlation between EU reform and enlargement, a potential slow-down of the so-called post-Nice reform process could have negatively affected EU widening.

In spite of the above considerations, September 11 and its aftermath did not negatively affect the enlargement process. On the contrary, the process did not lose but rather gained momentum. The vast majority of accession countries were able to provisionally close a number of negotiation chapters. The Belgian Presidency in the second half of 2001, although very preoccupied with coordinating the EU’s anti-terrorist reactions, was able to fulfill the objectives laid down in the Commission’s roadmap, which had been adopted by the Nice European Council in December 2000. Moreover, the Heads of State and Government have reaffirmed their determination to conclude negotiations with a first number of candidate countries by the end of 2002, so that those states can participate in the elections to the European Parliament in 2004 as members. Acknowledging the progress made in the negotiations and agreeing with the 2001 Progress Report of the Commission, the Laeken European Council identified ten countries able to conclude negotiations by the end of 2002. Although a number of unsettled problems still remain (e.g. negotiations on the chapters concerning agriculture and structural policy; the
Cyprus question), the likelihood of a “big bang” enlargement by 2004/2005 including up to 10 new member states has increased. At the same time, the state of preparation of the candidates and the modalities and the complexity of the accession negotiations did not and do not allow an earlier entry of new member states – as some had pledged in favour of after September 11.

One cannot yet assess the impact of the fight against international terrorism on subsequent second or third rounds of enlargement. However, as the details of a next round of EU widening will become evident at the end of 2002 or early 2003, there will be a need to agree on a coherent and binding enlargement strategy. If the Union does not want to risk losing its capacity as an anchor of democratic stability and economic reform in those countries which will have not entered the Union in a next round of enlargement, it must bring those countries closer to its policies and stipulate definite dates of accession in the framework of a post-enlargement-enlargement strategy.

Effects of an evolving acquis
In an effort to fight international terrorism, the EU has tabled a series of proposals and adopted a number of actions, especially in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. The agreements reached will affect the conditions under which new members join the EU, since demands on accession countries will increase. The adoption of a quickly developing acquis on internal security constitutes a major challenge for the candidates' already stretched police and judicial systems. The accession countries will have to strengthen their border-control efforts, share intelligence and information and increase their state capacity to track the movement of persons. The EU will have to help in developing institutional capacities and prove practical assistance, both human and financial.

The fight against international terrorism requires to improve coherence and coordination between the EU’s external and internal security concerns. To achieve this, the Union should take into account the neighbourhood aspects of existing border regimes, visa and immigration policies when designing, implementing and revising common strategies on its direct neighbourhood in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Proposals on legislation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs should contain a “neighbourhood impact assessment” that considers the specific exposure of the accession countries and/or future new member states.
In an attempt to strengthen border controls on the enlarged EU's new eastern borders, thought should be given to the idea to establish a “European Border Guard”, consisting of border guards from all member states who are specially trained to serve in joint missions. Countries with an external border would transfer their control duties to the European Border Guard and share the burdens of border policing with all member states. Countries without an external border could contribute to the costs of border policing directly and/or via the EU budget and get access to sensitive information through their national officials serving in such a border guard. Such a European Border Guard needs to be based on the principles of equal partnership and reciprocity among new and old member states.

Finally, with the fusion of the Single Market and the Schengen zone, there is a rationale to create a European Customs Service composed of customs officers from all member states. Through a joint institution, member states could share the financial burdens (and revenues), exercise a joint control and thus develop mutual confidence.

European integration beyond September 11 - impetus or blockade for the EU reform process?

There were two rival theses after the terrorist attacks of September 11: Some thought that the EU might be forced to press faster and more urgently for integration in order to address the challenges of international terrorism. Others, however, expected the process of integration to slow down or even that the community method would step back behind intergovernmental processes of coordination.

At first, both processes could be observed: At the summit of Gent in October 2001 as well as at a dramatic dinner at 10 Downing Street, which was planned for a small group of leaders, a more intensified process of coordination among the "big three" – Germany, UK, France – in the fight against terrorism seemed to be established. There have already been complaints about the development of a political directoire of the big member states. Yet, parallel to this and within the shortest of time 80 measures to fight terrorism have been adopted within the EU framework.

The EU has taken action in various policy fields and has shown considerable engagement to adapt itself to the new conditions of international politics after September 11.
However, in many cases – for example the tightening of the directive against money laundering or the proposals for a European arrest warrant – these measures have been discussed on the European level for a long time, but could not be realized. In these cases September 11 had a catalytic effect to overcome worries by single member states. The measures named above, however, have only been a start. On top of that, the EU intends to develop interior security as part of a wider definition of security.

The EU reform process
A second important area of the internal development of the EU which might be affected by the events relating to September 11 is the process of reforming the institutions and decision-making processes of the EU. This process goes back to an assignment by the summit of Nice in December 2000. The EU should be enabled to tackle future challenges by being provided with an understandable division of tasks, a democratic division of power and a simplified body of treaties. The Belgian presidency of the Council intended to pave the way for the coming process of reform at the Laeken summit on 14 and 15 December 2001. This agenda, however, has been changed in a dramatic manner. The fight against international terrorism was given first priority after the attacks of September 11. Belgium, nevertheless, managed to bring the internal reforms of the EU back into focus again. On the basis of proposals made by a small but prominent advisory group, the Belgian premier Verhofstadt presented a paper with about 60 questions on the future of Europe to the other European capitals. Backed by Germany and France, who had explicitly expressed their support for a European constitution at their meeting in Nantes on November 23, the draft was approved by all member states.

The 60 questions posed in the Laeken Declaration of the European Council hide an agenda which, given the quarrels at the Nice summit, the various problems of European policy making, and diverging national interests on the future of Europe, can almost be called presumptuous. For the EU intends nothing less than a general revision of its competencies, institutions and treaties:

- The distribution and delimitation of competencies between the Member States and the EU are to be reorganized. This may mean intensified integration, in particular in issues of internal and external security, as well as the re-delegation of tasks to the national level.
In order to achieve more democracy, transparency and efficiency, the interrelationship among the Union's institutions is to be examined. For that purpose, the currently existing decision-making patterns will be basically reviewed. As a consequence, the direct election of the President of the Commission, a stronger role of the national parliaments, and the abolition of the Presidency’s six-months term of office will have to be discussed.

While heading for a Constitution, the present Treaties are to be simplified. Core questions deal with the future legal status of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the simplification and reorganization of the Treaties as well as with putting an end to the differentiation between “Community” and “Union”.

A successful implementation of this stage of the reform process will result in the establishment of a Political Union as it was aimed at as early as eleven years ago with the 1991 Maastricht Treaty. Yet the single market and economic union were neither then nor with the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty or the 2000 Nice Treaty complemented by corresponding political structures. Once again the chance to achieve Political Union is now offered by the work of the Convention. These plans for reform, therefore, refer to long-term projects. The effect of September 11 in the areas in question can only be to exert additional pressure to take action and to provide just one more argument for the necessity of efficient and democratically legitimated decision-making procedures. The basic need for reform for an enlarging Union that wants to be a globally relevant player had already been a matter of urgency before September 11.

Conclusion

After decades of focusing on economic objectives, the EU, today, is more and more measured by its performance in basic duties of the state such as the guarantee of interior and exterior security, the realization of personal freedom, general prosperity and appropriate social conditions. The fact that these challenges had already been tackled before September 11 illustrates the magnitude of the ambitious integration projects initiated by the member states and the common institutions over the past few years:

- introduction of Euro notes and coins in January 2002;
- start of the Lisbon-Process in March 2000 to develop a modern knowledge-based society, which is intended to make the common market the most competitive and dynamic economic area in the world;
• conclusion of the first enlargement negotiations by the end of 2002, followed by the entry of new member states;
• decision to build up a military and civilian capacity to react on crises by 2003;
• development of an area of freedom, security and law by 2004;
• continuation of the debate on the future of Europe, which had begun before the Nice summit, and conclusion of the reform of the EU system by 2004.

All these projects will change the face of Europe lastingly and fundamentally. For the European Union they imply even more political responsibility and they strengthen the claims for working decision-making procedures. September 11 meant an additional impetus for integration that will influence the reform of the political system of the EU.